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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech, the fundamental freedom from a
fettered tongue and frustrated mind, is a cornerstone of the
United States Bill of Rights and is extended to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Since its conception,
this right has expanded to cover many forms of speech
including student speech. However, as the Supreme Court
cautioned in Tinker v. Des Moines, this is not an absolute
right.2 Today, when student speech broadcasted over the
Internet emotionally wounds and even plays a role in the
deaths of other students, the need for regulation is even more
apparent.3 New York Times columnist Charles Blow wrote on
October 14, 2011 how being bullied in school led him to decide
to commit suicide.4 He was eight years old and felt the
bleakness of the bullied.5 This was before the days of
cyberbullying. Back then, “[t]he schoolyard bullies beat you
up and then [went] home,” notes Parry Aftab, Internet safety
expert and privacy lawyer.6 Now “cyberbullies beat you up at
home, at grandma’s house, whereever [sic] you’re connected to

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV.
2. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969).
3. See Yunji de Nies et al., Mean Girls: Cyberbullying Blamed for Teen
Suicides, ABC
NEWS
(Jan.
28,
2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/
Parenting/girls-teen-suicide-calls-attention-cyberbullying/story?id=9685026
#.TwOeg9QV1_c.
4. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Bleakness of the Bullied, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/opinion/blow-the-bleakness-of-thebullied.html?_r=0.
5. See id.
6. de Nies, supra note 3.
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technology.”7 Charles Blow changed his mind, but recent
examples of suicides connected to cyberbullying show that
many times these decisions are carried through to the very
end. In January 2010, Phoebe Prince, fifteen, killed herself
as a final response to weeks of cruel bullying inflicted by
students at her school.8 Phoebe’s little sister found her
hanging in the stairwell.9 In March 2010, Alexis Pilkington,
seventeen, took her life due to vicious taunting aimed at her
from social networking sites.10 There are many more stories
of teenagers harassed over the Internet and courts are
struggling with how and whether schools should punish the
perpetrators.
This paper will examine the intersection of cyberbullying,
student speech and ubiquitous computing. The principal
legal problem is the circuit split over when and whether to
use Tinker v. Des Moines. However, additional problems are
presented by the ambiguous extent of schools’ jurisdiction
over speech originating off-campus and the nature of
ubiquitous computing.
Part I of this Comment will provide essential background
information on the issue, define cyberbullying and ubiquitous
computing, and touch on the iconic Supreme Court quartet
concerning student speech.11 Part II will identify the legal
issues at hand.12 It will explore the circuit split and examine
the various analyses utilized by the Third and Fourth
Circuits when faced with cyberbullying in public schools.13
This section will also examine issues related to the increased
amount of data and access to student speech afforded to
school and government officials due to the rise in ubiquitous
computing.14

7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Nancy Gibbs, When Bullying Goes Criminal, TIME (Apr. 19, 2010)
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978773,00.html.
10. Cyberbullying Continued After Teen’s Death, CBS NEWS (Mar. 29, 2010,
12:31
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/29/earlyshow/main
6343077.shtml.
11. See infra Part I
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
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Part III will propose a possible solution to the circuit split
and address some concerns about ubiquitous computing.15
The proposed solution consists of (1) a process for establishing
school jurisdiction over cyber-speech, (2) using a substantial
disruption standard to determine whether the speech can be
regulated, and (3) analyzing the effects of excessive data and
ubiquitous computing on students’ expectations of privacy
both on-campus and off-campus.16
I.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The term cyberbullying was first coined by Bill Belsey,
creator and president of bullying.org, the world’s first website
devoted to bullying over the Internet.17 His definition is as
follows: “Cyberbullying involves the use of information and
communication technologies to support deliberate, repeated,
and hostile behaviour by an individual or group, that is
intended to harm others.”18 This activity takes place every
day in many forms throughout the country and mainly
impacts young people.19 A step above schoolyard bullying,
cyberbullying is not restricted to school hallways,
playgrounds, and classrooms.
It leaks onto students’
computer screens and washes through their phones, following
them with unprecedented accuracy and range.
Cyberbullying is rapidly increasing due to the rise of
ubiquitous computing. “As the third paradigm of computing,
ubiquitous computing completes the shift of the computer’s
place and role from its mainframe roots to its embedded
future.”20 Today, the computer is “embedded throughout the
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. Bill Belsey: Pioneer Cyberbullying Activist, CYBERBULLYING NEWS (May
23,
2010),
http://www.cyberbullyingnews.com/2010/05/bill-belsey-pioneercyberbullying-activist.
18. Cyberbullying Definition, http://www.cyberbullying.org/ (last visited
Feb. 27, 2013).
19. Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping
the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV.
845, 847 (2010).
20. M. Scott Boone, Ubiquitous Computing, Virtual Worlds and the
Displacement of Property Rights, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 91, 93
(2008). The author notes that the first paradigm consisted of “the mainframe
computer filling entire rooms, utilized only by specialists” and the second
paradigm includes the world of personal computers used by a general populace.
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physical world” and almost “universal . . . in its
connectivity.”21 We utilize this connectivity in everyday tasks
and it is no longer limited to personal computers.22 With
more students using smart phones, text messages, Facebook
posts, emails, and other forms of instant thought, remote
communications are more common, and easily used to bully
others.23
Punishing such conduct is difficult because restrictions
may not unconstitutionally curb student speech, and many
states do not have specific legislation penalizing
cyberbullying, so its victims must often resort to semi-related
tort or criminal laws.24 The topic of student speech is
especially difficult because the Supreme Court has not ruled
on the issue. Consequently, there is a circuit split over which
framework and precedents to use in analyzing the issue.25
The split will be discussed at length in Part II of this
Comment.
A. The Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse Quartet
Supreme Court precedent on student speech can be found
in the iconic case quartet of Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse.26
In Tinker, the Court protected students’ right to wear a black
armband at school to protest the war in Vietnam and outlined
a substantial disruption test for student speech.27 The
majority noted that though a student does not leave his
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, his exercise of
such rights within the boundaries of the school are limited.28

Id. We are currently experiencing an overlap between the second paradigm and
the beginning of the third paradigm.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See King, supra note 19, at 850.
24. See id. at 849.
25. See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915 (3d Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir.
2011); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011).
26. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
27. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505, 514.
28. See id. at 506–07.
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The Court decided that “conduct by the student, in class or
out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time,
place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.”29
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court held that
the First Amendment did not protect lewd speech by a
student during an assembly.30 The Court recognized a state
“interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and
offensive
spoken
language”
because
such
speech
31
“undermine[s] the school’s basic educational mission.”
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court
addressed the issue of school sponsorship of speech32 and
allowed the school to strike two articles from the student
newspapers based on their content.33 The Court noted that,
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
The Court also gave “wide discretion to
concerns.”34
educators to determine reasonable pedagogical concerns,
ranging from speech that is ‘inadequately researched’ to that
which is ‘unsuitable for immature audiences.’ ”35 Morse v.
Frederick, the most recent case, touched on speech outside of
school grounds and involved a debate about whether a school
could punish students for speech involving alleged advocacy
for illegal drug use when that speech took place at an offcampus rally.36 The Court upheld the punishment of the offcampus speech because it determined the event to be a school
sponsored activity.37 These cases form the groundwork for
understanding the Court’s treatment of student speech. The
Internet, however, is changing the very nature of speech, and
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 513.
See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
See id. at 684–85.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).
See id. at 266.
Id. at 273.
See King, supra note 19, at 868 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271)).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007).
Id. at 401–02.
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will require these principles to evolve as well.
B. Factual Backgrounds of the Cases on CyberBullying: J.S.
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, Layshock ex
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, and Kowalski v.
Berkeley County School
Recent cases on cyberbullying have produced several
different analyses in the circuit courts. Since the Supreme
Court has never considered the issue specifically, the lower
courts have no choice but to fashion different methods of
handling the situation, causing splits between and even
within the circuits. This Comment will examine three cases,
J.S., Kowalski, and Layshock, and explore the split between
the Fourth and Third Circuit as well the as the split within
each of these circuits.38 J.S. and Layshock were both decided
on June 13, 2011 by the Third Circuit, but the cases follow
different frameworks.39 Kowalski, the most recent case,
decided by the Fourth Circuit on July 27, 2011, tipped the
balance towards extending the authority of school officials
when punishing students for off-campus cyberbullying.40
1. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District
On March 18, 2007, J.S, an eighth grader, created a fake
profile for her principal and posted it on MySpace, a social
networking website.41 She created the profile at home using
her parents’ computer.42 The profile did not identify Principal
McGonigle by name or post, but used his official picture from
the school’s website.43 It was presented as a “self-portrayal of
a bisexual Alabama middle school principal named ‘M-Hoe’ ”
and contained “crude content and vulgar language, ranging
38. See generally J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915 (3d Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir.
2011); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011). These cases were chosen because they are the most recent examples of
the legal issues dealt with by circuit courts in attempting to wade through
cyberbullying and student speech jurisprudence. While this Comment mostly
examines the split between the Third and Fourth Circuits, the chosen cases also
refer to the issues tackled by the Second Circuit in similar circumstances.
39. See J.S., 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205.
40. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572.
41. J.S., 650 F.3d at 920.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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from nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful
personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family.”44 J.S.
listed the principal’s interests as “detention, being a tight ass,
riding the fraintrain, spending time with my child (who looks
like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office,
hitting on students and their parents.”45
This profile was first open to a general viewership but
J.S. relegated it to a private status after several students
from the school informed her that they had seen and “thought
the profile was funny.”46 The Third Circuit commented that
“[t]hough disturbing, the record indicates that the profile was
so outrageous that no one took its content seriously. J.S.
testified that she intended the profile to be a joke between
herself and her friends."47 Since the school computers blocked
access to MySpace, no one could access the profile from school
and Principal McGonigle learned of its existence through a
student.48 “McGonigle asked this student to bring him a
printout of the profile to school the next day, which she did. It
is undisputed that the only printout of the profile that was
ever brought to school was one brought at McGonigle’s
specific request.”49
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the school and J.S. challenged.50 The court of appeals
reviewed the case de novo on whether the grant of summary
judgment was appropriate in this case.51 The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling, but hearing the case again
en banc, vacated its prior decision and reversed the ruling on
the First Amendment issue in the lower court.52 The court’s
ruling is as follows: the school district reasonably could not
have forecast substantial disruption of, or material
interference with, the school when an eighth grade student
created, from her home computer, an Internet profile of the
school principal using photos from the school website,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 925.
See id.
See id. at 920.
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insinuating that he was a sex addict and pedophile.
Therefore, the school district violated the student’s First
Amendment free speech rights when it suspended her for
creating the profile. This is especially so considering she took
specific steps to make the profile private so only her friends
could access it, and the profile itself was so outrageous that
no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did.53
2. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School
District
Justin Layshock, a seventeen-year-old senior at a high
school in Pennsylvania, also used MySpace to create a parody
profile of his high school principal.54 He created this profile
sometime in December 2005, using a personal computer at his
grandmother’s house.55 “The only school resource that was
even arguably involved in creating the profile was a
photograph of Trosch [the principal] that Justin copied from
the School District’s website.”56 Layshock restricted access to
the profile, allowing only designated friends to view the
material.57 “Not surprisingly, word of the profile ‘spread like
wildfire’ and soon reached most, if not all, of . . . [the] student
body.”58 The administration became aware of the profile
when a teacher spotted the profile on a student’s computer
screen and had to discipline several students for congregating
around it and giggling.59 The theme of Layshock’s parody
profile was ‘big’ because the principal “is apparently a large
man.”60 The following is a sample of the profile:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills.61
After viewing this profile, several other students created
53. Id. at 928–31.
54. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–08
(3d Cir. 2011).
55. Id. at 207.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 208.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 209.
60. Id. at 208.
61. See id. (footnote omitted).
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parody profiles for the same principal and “[e]ach of those
profiles was more vulgar and more offensive than Justin’s.”62
Layshock used the school’s computers to access the
profile and show it to other students.63 As a result of his
profile and the derivate profiles of other students, the school
had to suspend computer classes and monitor students’ use of
their personal computers.64 Principal Trosch believed the
profiles to be “degrading, demeaning, demoralizing, and
shocking. He was also concerned about his reputation and
complained to the local police.”65
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Layshock, and the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.66
Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit later vacated its prior
ruling, and once again affirmed the district court decision's
finding in favor of Layshock.67 The court ruled that though
Layshock had used school computers to access the profile, this
did not “forge a nexus between the School and Justin’s
profile.”68 There was no evidence that Layshock engaged in
lewd or profane speech while in school, and his speech did not
result in any substantial disruption of school.69
3. Kowalski v. Berkeley County School
Unlike the preceding cases, the cyberbullying in this case
was targeted towards a fellow high school student, not a
school official.70 Kara Kowalski, a twelfth grade student at
Musselman High School in the Berkeley County School
District created a MySpace page titled Students Against Sluts
Herpes (S.A.S.H).71 “Kowalski claimed in her deposition that
‘S.A.S.H.’ was an acronym for ‘Students Against Sluts
Herpes,’ but a classmate, Ray Parsons, stated that it was an
acronym for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” referring to
another
Musselman
High
School
Student,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
See id. at 209.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
See id. at 216.
Id. at 214–15.
See id. at 216.
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 567.
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Shay N. . . . .”72
Ray Parsons was the first one to join the group.73 He
uploaded a “photograph of himself and a friend holding their
noses while displaying a sign that read, ‘Shay Has Herpes,’
referring to Shay N.”74 Kowalski promptly posted a positive
response, stating “Ray you are soo funny!=),” after which
Parsons added two more photographs of Shay N.75 “In the
first, he had drawn red dots on Shay N.’s face to simulate
herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region, that read,
In the second
‘Warning: Enter at your own risk.’ ”76
photograph, he captioned Shay N.’s face with a sign that read,
“portrait of a whore.”77 The commentary posted on this
webpage mostly targeted Shay N. and was authored by
Two posts singled
Musselman High School students.78
Kowalski out as the creator of the page and credited her with
“mastermind[ing] a group that hates [someone].”79 After
discovering the webpage, Shay N.’s parents complained to the
school.80 Shay N. refused to attend her classes, feeling
targeted and harassed.81 Kowalski claimed that she was
unable to take down the webpage and renamed it “Students
Against Angry People” in response to the harassment charges
filed against her.82 The school district disciplined her for
these actions and Kowalski began this action by filing suit
and contending that the school district had violated her rights
to free speech and due process.83 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the school district holding that
it was authorized to discipline Kowalski for her webpage.84
Reviewing the case de novo, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
judgment of the district court.85
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 567, 570.
Id. at 567.

JOSHI FINAL

640

7/23/2013 9:26 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The Supreme Court has never issued a decision
concerning cyberbullying.86 This leaves the circuit courts to
their own devices in fashioning rules, limits, and guidelines
for school districts. Though there is a set framework on
regulating student speech within the schools, or student
speech that contains the imprimatur of the school, it does not
always cover situations created by the rise of ubiquitous
computing.87 Currently, there is a split among the circuits,
and even within the Third Circuit, over how and when to use
Tinker to regulate off-campus student bullying.88
The fragmented nature of the jurisprudence leaves school
districts unsure of their jurisdiction over student actions, and
more importantly, it leaves the victims of cyberbullying
without guidance or assurance of a remedy. The fact that
most states and cities do not have specific cyberbullying
ordinances also makes it difficult for victims to seek
retribution through the legal system.89
III. ANALYSIS
The rifts in the opinions analyzed here run along four
main lines: (1) whether Tinker should be used for off-campus
speech,90 (2) if using Tinker, should a court look for a
reasonable forecast of substantial disruption or for an actual
substantial disruption,91 (3) how the “everywhere at once”
nature of ubiquitous computing affects student speech,92 and
(4) whether cyberbullying cases merit a departure from the

86. See id. at 571.
87. King, supra note 19, at 870. The Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse
quartet is useful for providing guidelines of student speech when it is political,
lewd, or sponsored by the school in some way. However, these cases do not
address the multitude of issues created by ubiquitous computing and
cyberbullying and may in fact serve to stunt the growth of legal discourse in this
area if they are applied without more thought to the current context and
technology.
88. See supra Part I.B.
89. See id. at 849, 857.
90. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring).
91. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 571; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2011).
92. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
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Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse framework.93
A. Whether Tinker Should be Used for Off-Campus Speech
In Tinker, the Supreme Court ruled that student speech
is protected unless it causes a substantial disruption.94 The
case specifically referred to student speech that took place oncampus, but the framework can apply to cyberbullying that
involves off-campus speech.
However, as the opinions
discussed below explain, the Tinker holding cannot be used as
is. It should be modified to accommodate the evolution of
speech.
J.S. helps illustrate the reasoning behind choosing a
Tinker approach. In this case, the district court did not follow
Tinker.95 Instead, the court focused on the content of the
online profile, which it found to be lewd and sexually
explicit.96 On appeal, however, the Third Circuit chose to
apply the Tinker test, holding that adopting another standard
would allow schools “to punish any speech by a student that
takes place anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the
school or a school official, is brought to the attention of a
school official, and is deemed ‘offensive’ by the prevailing
authority.”97 The court also cautioned that “[u]nder this
standard, two students can be punished for using a vulgar
remark to speak about their teacher at a private party, if
another student overhears the remark, reports it to the school
authorities, and the school authorities find the remark
Tinker better captures the effect of
‘offensive.’ ”98
cyberbullying, with its focus on the victim as opposed to other
cases approached where the focus is on the individual student
engaged in the speech.
Instead of creating a new standard for cyberbullying, the
Third Circuit decided that since the Supreme Court had
“analyzed the extent to which school officials can regulate
student speech in several thorough opinions,”99 it would use
93.
94.
(1969).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
J.S., 650 F.3d at 923.
See id.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id. at 925.
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established precedent.100 While the decision to use this iconic
case was appropriate, the majority opinion should have taken
the unique nature of the off-campus speech into consideration
and not used Tinker as a prêt-à-porter case.
The decision to apply Tinker, however, was not
unanimous. The en banc Third Circuit did not come to an
even consensus and presented a splintered document with a
lengthy concurrence and a strong dissent.101 The concurrence,
authored by Judge Smith and joined by Chief Judge McKee
and Judges Sloviter, Fuentes, and Hardiman, varies on what
the key issues should be, but reaches the same conclusion as
the majority.102 Judge Smith states:
I write separately to address a question that the majority
opinion expressly leaves open: whether Tinker applies to
off-campus speech in the first place. I would hold that it
does not, and that the First Amendment protects students
engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it
protects speech by citizens in the community at large.103

The dissent authored by Judge Fisher and joined by
Judges Scirica, Rendell, Barry, Jordan, and Vanaskie,104
embarks down a third path.
It holds that while the
application of the Tinker test to off-campus speech may be
appropriate, the court did not apply the substantial
The dissent
disturbance test correctly to the facts.105
highlights the fact that the speech here was lewd and vulgar,
not political in nature like in Tinker.106 Consistent with the
rest of the opinion, the dissent is also at war with itself.107
After applying the facts of this case to Tinker’s rule and
holding in favor of the school, Judge Fisher exhibits a
discomfort with using Tinker for off-campus speech. He
writes that “[i]n Tinker, the Court stated that ‘conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by constitutional
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id. at 933.
Id. at 936–52.
Id. at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id. at 943.
Id. at 941–52.
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guarantee of freedom of speech.’ ”108 He finds the language
unclear and asks whether Tinker “means to distinguish the
classroom from the world beyond the schoolhouse gates, or if
it simply means out of class but in the cafeteria, schoolyard,
or other areas on school grounds.”109 It is obvious here that
the judges agree that Tinker is important but are unclear on
how to use the case. The application of Tinker either needs to
be modified so as to fit the nature of cyberspeech or the
Tinker rule used must be supplemented by another theory
that better accommodates the fluidity of boundaries created
by the ubiquitous use of the Internet.
The Third Circuit also examined whether the Tinker test
applied to off-campus speech in Layshock. Though the cases
were decided on the same day, the Layshock decision takes an
entirely different route.110 The majority opinion in Layshock
avoided Tinker altogether and chose to follow precedent set
by the Second Circuit, asking whether there was a sufficient
nexus between Layshock’s speech and the school.111 The
strongly worded J.S. dissent chose to apply a new case,
Doninger v. Niehoff, which would increase the school district’s
authority over off-campus speech.112 In Doninger, the Second
Circuit faced a situation where a high school student used a
blog to encourage other students and members of the
community to contact the school and complain about an
allegedly cancelled concert.113 Layshock points out that in
this case, the Second Circuit upheld the student’s punishment
because it “‘ created a foreseeable risk of substantial
disruption to the work and discipline of the school.’ ”114
Despite the efforts of the Third Circuit, ignoring a landmark
case like Tinker actually weakens the opinion and takes it
farther away from existing jurisprudence.

108. See id. at 942 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)).
109. Id.
110. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 220 (3d
Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 214.
112. J.S., 650 F.3d at 915 (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.
2008)).
113. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44–45.
114. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 218 (quoting Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53).
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The Fourth Circuit in Kowalski chose to use Tinker to
regulate off-campus student speech. Instead of assuming the
case applied to the facts at issue like the Third Circuit did in
J.S., the majority opinion states “the language of Tinker
supports the conclusion that public schools have a ‘compelling
interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts
the work and discipline of the school, including discipline for
student harassment and bullying.”115 The opinion then
articulates that “student-on-student bullying is a ‘major
concern’ in schools across the country and can cause victims
to become depressed and anxious, to be afraid to go to school,
and to have thoughts of suicide.”116 Therefore, just “as schools
have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for
students free from messages advocating illegal drug use,
schools have a duty to protect their students from harassment
and bullying in the school environment.”117 It is important to
note here that the court carefully specifies that halting
“student-on-student” bullying is a compelling interest but did
not widen its holding to other situations. In J.S. and
Layshock, the bullying victims were adults and authority
figures in the schools, possessing considerably greater power
than the student victim in Kowalski. Here, in Kowalski, the
strong application of Tinker, and expansion of the school’s
jurisdiction to off-campus speech was likely prompted by a
concern for minors. The Third Circuit may have been less
inclined to apply this brand of forceful reasoning because of
the age of the victims in both J.S. and Layshock.
Based on the divisive split amongst courts, it is clear that
the identity of the victim is extremely important to the
evolution of caselaw. For example, two out of the three cases
analyzed in this Comment have adult victims. Not only were
they adults, but, as administrators or staff members of the
schools, they possessed considerably greater power and
influence over their bullies. As adults, they were also more
likely to report and remedy the bullying incidents. Children
are less likely to come forward as victims, less likely to seek
legal recourse and therefore contribute less to the evolution of
legal theory. Lack of litigation where minors are victims of
115. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011).
116. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
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cyberbullying may be the reason why courts are not applying
Tinker in a way that would increase schools’ jurisdiction over
actions committed off-campus.
B. When Applying Tinker, Should Courts Require a
Reasonable Forecast of Substantial Disruption or an Actual
Disruption?
The Third Circuit specified in the majority opinion of J.S.
that there must be a reasonable forecast of a substantial
disruption at school in order to justify a restriction on student
speech.118 It further held that “[i]f Tinker’s black armbands—
an ostentatious reminder of the highly emotional and
controversial subject of the Vietnam war—could not
‘reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities,’
neither can J.S.’s profile, despite the unfortunate humiliation
it caused for [Principal] McGonigle.”119
The concurring opinion took a different approach.
Though it did not advocate applying Tinker, Judge Smith
takes the time to declare that in the event a court were to
choose to apply Tinker, it should not utilize the foreseeable
standard, but rather look to whether there the speech caused
an actual disruption.120 He posits:
I would have no difficulty applying Tinker to a case where
a student sent a disruptive email to school faculty from his
home computer. Regardless of its place of origin, speech
intentionally directed towards a school is properly
considered on-campus speech. On the other hand, speech
originating off campus does not mutate into on-campus
speech simply because it foreseeably makes its way onto
campus.121

He insists that a “bare foreseeability standard could be
stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus
expression that happened to discuss school-related
matters.”122
118. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d
Cir. 2011).
119. Id. at 929–30 (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
120. See id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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Interestingly, the dissenting opinion finds more common
ground on this matter with the majority than does the
concurrence.123 The dissent condones using a foreseeability
standard, but applies the facts of the J.S. case to the rule
differently and ultimately comes out in favor of the school
district.124 In doing so, it aligns itself with the Second Circuit
and its opinion in Doninger.125 The dissent is more concerned
with the school as an institution than the majority. To the
dissent, the effects on the community and on the concept of
public education are at the heart of the issue. This outlook
focuses on the very foundation of the relationship between
students and their teachers. Judge Fisher is concerned with
students “making false accusations” and worries about
leaving a school “powerless” against student speech.126
Interestingly, the judges see the adult as one who is helpless
and without the power to defend the institution. The dissent
wants to protect public schools and therefore aligns with the
school district and the Second Circuit.
Though the Third Circuit only requires that student
speech have a reasonable forecast of causing disruption,127 the
Fourth Circuit in Kowalski advocated requiring an actual
disruption of the school environment in order for the school to
step in and regulate student speech. The majority opinion
states, “[a]t bottom, we conclude that the school was
authorized to discipline Kowalski because her speech
interfered with the work and discipline of the school.”128 The
court states in unequivocal terms that “Kowalski’s speech
caused the interference and disruption described in
Tinker.”129 It added that because the purpose of the speech
was to target a student with vicious remarks and accusations,
123. See id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 950–51.
126. See id. at 941 (Smith, J., concurring).
127. See id. (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607
F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)). In Thomas, a group of high school students was
suspended for producing a satirical publication targeted at the school
community. See 607 F.2d 1043. They were careful to distribute the material
away from school and did most of the work away from school. Id. at 1045. The
Second Circuit determined that the publication was not sufficiently related to
the school to justify its exercise of authority over it. See id. at 1050–53.
128. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).
129. Id. at 572.
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the educational system was not required to tolerate it.130 The
deep disruption of a student’s psyche was akin to the
disruption mentioned in Tinker.131 The Fourth Circuit was
likely trying to separate itself from the inconclusive Third
Circuit and set forth a strong precedent to protect future
student victims of cyberbullying.
Strong opinions in the Third and Fourth Circuits seem to
be choosing to apply Tinker and supporting the idea of a
school environment safe from bullies. However, without a
clear Tinker test, or even a more substantial choice to apply
Tinker at all, lower courts around the country are seriously
lacking in guidance on cyberbullying.
C. The “Everywhere at Once” Nature of Ubiquitous
Computing and Student Speech
A notable section of the court’s concurrence in the J.S.
opinion expressly addresses the tricky web woven by
ubiquitous computing around student speech.132 Judge Smith
asks “how can one tell whether speech takes place on or off
campus?”133 He then admits that “[t]he answer plainly cannot
turn solely on where the speaker was sitting when the speech
was originally uttered . . . [because this would] fail to
accommodate the somewhat ‘everywhere at once’ nature of
the internet.”134 The Layshock concurrence also sees the oncampus and off-campus distinction mentioned in its majority
opinion, and in the majority opinion of J.S., as largely
obsolete. Judge Jordan writes that a student could use the
tools of modern technology to “engineer egregiously disruptive
events . . . while standing one foot outside school property,
[and] the school administrators might succeed in heading off
the actual disruption in the building but would be left
powerless to discipline the student.”135 He sees this as
problematic, finding it difficult “to see how words that may
cause pandemonium in a public school would be protected by
130. See id. at 573.
131. See id. at 572.
132. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940
(3d Cir. 2011).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 221 (3d
Cir. 2011).
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the First Amendment simply because technology now allows
the timing and distribution . . . to be controlled by someone
beyond the campus boundary.”136 These words go to the heart
of the technology issue. Ubiquitous computing “undoubtedly
create[s] a plethora of legal issues, both by challenging the
ability of existing legal rules to cope with radically new
circumstances and by creating situations so new as to be
seemingly ungoverned by existing legal rules.”137
While the Layshock and J.S. opinions address the
slippery nature of new technology, the Kowalski opinion is
resolute in its silence on the matter.138 This causes another
split between the circuits. Reading the facts of the cases,
“legal issues presented by the advent of ubiquitous computing
are readily apparent . . . [and stem from] the potential loss of
privacy in continuously monitored environments that
constantly acquire, store and transmit information about
individuals in those environments.”139
When J.S. and Layshock created their parody profiles,
both students designated the pages as private and only
opened the discussions to other students.140 Their materials,
however, travelled beyond their designated boundaries and
Without
ultimately reached their school principals.141
ubiquitous computing, the school would have no way to
gather this data apart from using students to report each
other. Before smart phones and social networking, this would
have been an incident of passing notes between students.
The teacher, assuming he noticed it, would most likely
confiscate the note.
Here, we have inter-student
communication, which is also simultaneously being
broadcasted worldwide, increasing the potential for the
schools, and therefore the government, to capture this
information. “Just as previous communication technologies
. . . provided opportunities for the government to acquire
information while it was in transit, ubiquitous computing
technologies, particularly those aspects of ubiquitous
136. Id. at 222.
137. Boone, supra note 20, at 93.
138. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring); Kowalski v. Berkeley
Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.
139. Boone, supra note 20, at 94.
140. J.S., 650 F.3d at 921; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208.
141. J.S., 650 F.3d at 921; Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208.
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computing involved in sensing, storing, and transmitting
data, create new opportunities for the government to
intercept information.”142
This is apparent in how the schools in all three cases
discovered the bullying material.143 Students using the
interconnectivity and malleable nature of the Internet may
not always perceive the ease with which it may be
broadcasted to a much wider audience than originally
intended. This “inherent interconnectivity of ubiquitous
computing makes it so that the captured information may
often be in the hands of one or more third parties. The
government, in turn, may acquire the collected information
from those third parties . . . .”144 Consequently, schools can
monitor more speech now, and as a result, may seek to
exercise jurisdiction over more realms of student life because
such speech makes its way into the schoolhouse.
Scott Boone, Associate Professor of Law at Appalachian
Law and author, provides an example of how an entity could
monitor and control remote behavior solely through collecting
data previously unavailable to it.145 In his article on legal
issues presented by ubiquitous computing, he writes that
recently, certain Californians who rented cars discovered
upon return that their bill amounted to thousands of dollars
“It turned out,
instead of the expected hundreds.146
unbeknownst to them, that GPS in the rentals had monitored
the vehicle crossing into another state and that the fine print
in the rental contract provided for relatively high additional
charges if the rental was taken out of California.”147 The
information was collected and conveyed by devices connected
to the web. These devices were capable of broadcasting
information previously thought unavailable to car rental
companies.148 This is very similar to cases of cyberbullying
where access and capture of certain information may lead to
fines and punishments.
Students and schools are not
142. Boone, supra note 20, at 123.
143. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 921; Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 568; Layshock, 650 F.3d
at 209–10.
144. Boone, supra note 20, at 123.
145. See id. at 91, 144–45.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 145.
148. See id. at 144.
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contracting parties, and therefore, there is no immediate
result dictated by the increased monitoring. It is clear from
reading recent case law, however, that this facet of
communication technology needs regulations and rulings so
schools can continue to protect student speech while also
punishing and proscribing cyberbullying.
D. Whether Cyberbullying Cases Merit a Departure from the
Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse Framework
The Third Circuit decided Layshock and J.S. on the same
day and, in attempting to forge some sort of unity, applied
markedly different standards to the same set of facts.149 As
laid out in Part I, the facts of the two cases are almost
identical. It stands to reason then, that the same judges
would apply the same reasoning. The fact that they did no
such thing serves to highlight the legal issues and rifts
caused by cyberbullying. After providing a background on the
Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse quartet, the majority opinion
in Layshock makes use of Thomas v. Board of Education, a
Second Circuit case from 1979 dealing with the issue of
satirical student speech.150
In Thomas, several students produced a satirical
publication directed at the school.151 The periodical was
created off-campus, never sold at school, and the principal
only discovered it by confiscating it from a student who
brought it on campus.152 The Second Circuit focused on the
fact that the activity only had a de minimis connection with
the school and was therefore out of the school’s jurisdiction.153
The Third Circuit applied this analysis to Justin Layshock’s
situation and held that “the relationship between Justin’s
conduct and the school [was] far more attenuated than in
Thomas.”154 The opinion added that “the First Amendment
[could not] tolerate the School District stretching its authority
into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin . . . in
149. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
215 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S., 650 F.3d at 926.
150. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 215 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville
Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)).
151. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1050.
154. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.
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order to punish him for the expressive conduct that he
engaged in there.”155
Like the dissent in J.S., the Layshock majority opinion
cites Doninger but discredits it based on the facts.156
Doninger, a more recent case than Thomas, involves the same
technology issues and is about off-campus student speech.157
Interestingly, the court uses a much older case that does not
address technology concerns to uphold its reasoning.158
Reading the Layshock concurring opinion, it becomes evident
that the majority used Thomas in order to avoid using Tinker,
which would be sure to produce another splintered opinion.159
The concurring opinion in J.S. also offers an alternative
to the traditional student speech framework. Judge Smith, in
choosing not to apply Tinker, advocated using the First
Amendment to analyze cyberbullying speech that takes place
off-campus.160 His standards are also less student-specific
because he believes that “the First Amendment protects
students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it
protects speech by citizens in the community at large.”161 The
concurring opinion chooses to discard Tinker and the rest of
the framework because it believes the cases should be
grounded in the special characteristics of the school
environment.162 The speech in J.S. was not created or
transmitted in this environment and, therefore, the opinion
reasons, a standard First Amendment analysis should apply
to this sort of cyberbullying.163
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Cyberbullying in public schools can be regulated in a
variety of ways including school policies, legislation, and
court decisions. The path to regulation is currently unpaved
and foggy without a clear decision from courts. School
155. Id.
156. See id. at 217.
157. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
158. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 215.
159. See id. at 220 (Jordan, J., concurring).
160. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring).
161. Id.
162. See id. at 937.
163. See id.
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districts are unclear about what they can regulate and how
far they can go to prevent or punish bullying. “[S]chools
represent a critical battleground for cyberbullying
prevention” but “without direction on when and how they
may legally punish student Internet expression, [they] are
left paralyzed in the face of uncertainty.”164
A. Deciding on Tinker
With the split between and within the nation’s circuit
courts on the use of Tinker, schools and pupils have no way of
knowing which speech is protected and which is not. The
questions to be solved by the courts are as follows: (1) should
Tinker be applied to off-campus cyberbullying speech?, (2) if
so, which standard should apply?, and (3) do the special
characteristics of ubiquitous computing require additional
privacy and due process analysis when student speech is
involved?
B. Courts Should Use Tinker if a School Can Show it Has
Jurisdiction Over the Speech in Question
1. Obtaining Jurisdiction—Adapting the Minimum
Contacts Framework to Cyberspeech
All three cases discussed above spent a considerable
amount of time and ink discussing the boundary of the
schoolhouse and the location of the schoolhouse gate in order
to determine whether the speaker was on-campus or offcampus. “With respect to speech, courts have recognized the
unique characteristics of the school environment and have
given schools the authority to suppress speech inside the
school that would not be regulated outside of the school
setting.”165 However, as the concurrence in J.S. states, the
fluid nature of the Internet, combined with the expansive
reach of “smart” devices, makes it difficult to determine which
speech was strictly on-campus and which occurred offgrounds.166 Therefore, eradicating this increasingly fictional
164. King, supra note 19, at 874–75.
165. Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1233
(2003).
166. See J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
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boundary may serve a greater purpose in cyberbullying
jurisprudence than attempting to define it. The jurisdiction
of schools is greatest when students are in class and in the
school environment and decreases as the students move
further away. That being said, a student with an iPhone
linked with, for example, a Facebook application, could
effectively be engaging in on-campus speech as he contacts
other students, teachers and effects change in the school
environment. Similarly, the same student could be speaking
off-campus while wandering the school hallways.
The problem of school jurisdiction here is comparable to
the question of when a particular state has jurisdiction over
an individual. Much as the Third Circuit did in Layshock and
J.S., the early Supreme Court imagined jurisdiction based on
a strictly geographical model. In the 1877 case of Pennoyer v.
Neff, the Court stated that, “[t]he authority of every tribunal
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State
in which it is established.”167 The Court established that the
defendant must be present within a state for it to exercise
jurisdiction over him.168 However, as the country matured
and adopted new transportation technologies, its citizens
became increasingly more motile and geographical
boundaries became archaic determinations of jurisdiction.
Student speech through ubiquitous computing is the
equivalent of the transcontinental railroad, the system of
interstate highways and the invention of the airplane all
rolled into one sleek, portable device. One cannot expect
results with analysis reminiscent of Pennoyer and the
nineteenth century. On-campus and off-campus locations
should not be used to determine whether schools may reach
student speech, just as a defendant’s location is no longer the
sole determinant of whether a state can reach him.
Overturning the rigid geographical analysis of Pennoyer,
the Court stated in International Shoe that a state may have
jurisdiction over a defendant if said defendant has certain
minimum contacts within the state, and the if the suit does
not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
In sanctioning the State of Washington’s
justice.169
167. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
168. See id.
169. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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jurisdiction over a commercial entity based in Delaware, the
Court declared that if a company carries on systematic and
continuous activities within a state, has agents in the forum,
is putting products into the stream of commerce, and is
benefitting from the state, it is considered “present” in that
state.170 The Court heightened this standard in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, declaring that minimum
contacts meant the defendant had to purposefully avail
himself of the state.171 The activity in question had to be
directed at the state with a set purpose in mind.172
Additionally, the Court defined traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice to include: (1) evidence of minimum
contacts, (2) foreseeability of injury, and (3) a showing of the
state’s interests.173 Directly addressing the Internet, the
Court declared in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, that a
website would be considered “present” in a certain
jurisdiction based on “the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information.”174 A blog
that simply and freely posts information for an open and
undifferentiated audience is too passive to be present or to be
purposefully availing itself of any particular population of a
certain state of jurisdiction.175
These cases serve as a great frame of reference for courts
dealing with cyberbullying and student speech issues. This
jurisdictional analysis provides a clear answer to the question
of whether school districts can reach certain speech. Courts
should use this analysis to determine whether speech is
“present” at school and then move on to use Tinker. In
Thomas and Layshock, the Second and Third Circuits came
close to this type of reasoning but did not articulate an
applicable standard.176 Both cases looked at the nexus of the
speech with the school, which is very similar to what the
Supreme Court was looking for in its minimum contacts
170. See id. at 320.
171. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 291–92, 297.
174. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
175. See id. at 1126.
176. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
205, 215 (3d Cir. 2011).
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inquiry.177
For student speech, courts should examine
whether the speech, regardless of where it is composed, has
minimum contacts with the school, whether it is targeted
specifically at the school’s agents, whether the proscription of
the speech would be within the traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice and whether the cyber-content was
presented in a passive or active manner. In keeping with
precedent and policy, “school authority over off-campus
speech is narrower because outside of the school environment,
the freedom of speech is at its ‘zenith.’ ”178 “Therefore, courts
impose a heavy burden on schools to show sufficient
disruption to regulate off-campus speech.”179 In adapting
these jurisdictional tests, courts should maintain the heavy
burden for showing a substantial disruption caused by
cyberbullying.
Using this analysis, the school in question would have
jurisdiction over the speech if it could show that the speech in
question had minimum contacts within the school. If the
speech made systematic and continuous appearances on
campus, was spread by students or other agents of the school,
and is about any such agent, the speech will be considered
within the school’s jurisdiction. Adding the standard in
World-Wide Volkswagen, a court would also ask whether the
student purposefully availed himself of the school. This
would include using school images, sharing speech
specifically with the students of that that high school, or
using the students to disseminate the speech.
To determine whether the extension of jurisdiction would
be within the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, the court would look for the aforementioned minimum
contacts, determine whether there is a foreseeability of injury
stemming from the speech (this is similar to the Tinker
standard already used by the Third Circuit), and the school
would show that it had sufficient interest in extending its
jurisdiction over the speech. In J.S., the court cited a former
decision that required a compelling interest from the school in

177. See, e.g., id. at 215–16.
178. Servance, supra note 165, at 1234 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979)).
179. Id.
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order to sanction a proscription of speech.180 In Layshock, the
court observed that the school had a compelling interest in
providing students with a drug free environment.181 In
Kowalski, the court used this same reasoning to suggest that
the school had just as strong of an interest in providing
students with a school environment free from bullying and
harassment.182 In addition, policy concerns for the welfare
and development of minors would sway courts in favor of
accepting a sufficient school interest in providing a safe and
healthy environment for students.
The new standard for school jurisdiction could be as
follows: (1) does the speech in question have minimum
contacts with the school?, (2) can the school reasonably
forecast a substantial disruption of its environment as a
result of the speech?, and (3) does the school have a sufficient
interest in curbing the speech? Additionally, the courts could
also consider the ruling in Zippo, where the Court examined
the level of interactivity and passiveness of the website being
examined.183 Once the school proves that the speech passes
the criteria of minimum contacts and appears on an
interactive and active website, the school will have
jurisdiction to regulate the speech. However, it is most
important to remember that just because a school has
jurisdiction, it does not automatically have the ability to
proscribe and punish speech.
C. Courts Should Use the Substantial Disruption Standard
in Tinker
In the cases examined above, the courts seemed to
assume that the school had jurisdiction over the speech in
question. The current circuit split is over how and whether
Tinker should apply—essentially, what type of cyberbullying
speech the schools may punish.
In order for the
jurisprudence on this issue to be consistent, the split between
180. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933
(3d Cir. 2011) (citing Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 305 (3d Cir. 2000)).
181. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
407 (2007)).
182. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011).
183. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126
(W.D. Pa. 1997).
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and within the circuits must be mended. Courts should
follow the reasoning in Kowalski and examine whether the
speech actually caused a substantial disruption.184 However,
instead of keeping the reasoning identical to that case, courts
should bring the Tinker reasoning into the Internet age.
Using a multifactor analysis involving student
recklessness would tailor Tinker’s requirement of substantial
disruption to a cyberbullying context. For example, “the
school district may not constitutionally punish the student’s
speech unless the student intentionally or recklessly caused
the speech to be distributed on campus.”185 In this manner,
even if the speech were created away from the school using
student resources, the courts would examine the student’s
action in creating and distributing the speech in order to
determine whether it was harmful to the school environment.
“Intentional distribution of speech occurs when the
student . . . knows to a substantial certainty that the
student’s actions will cause the speech to be distributed inside
Furthermore, “[r]eckless
the schoolhouse gates.”186
distribution of speech occurs if the student, conscious of the
risk that the Internet speech will be distributed on-campus,
chooses to produce the Internet speech.”187 If the student has
intentionally or recklessly caused cyberbullying speech to
make a substantial disruption in the school, then a court may
use the precedent in Tinker to punish such speech.
This is not allowable if the disruption is foreseeable and
has not actually occurred. For example, if a student creates
harmful cyberbullying speech on an active website targeted at
a school agent and recklessly distributes it only to students of
that school, the school may not punish him if the speech
causes no disruption at the school. If the effects of the speech
are not felt in school, the school cannot punish the speech. If
however, the same speech is heavily discussed at school and
causes disruptions, then the speech may be punished. In
Kowalski, the website was shared with other students and
184. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572.
185. Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students' Rights: The Need
for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student
Internet Speech, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 150 (2007).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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Kowalski and several others said they were aware of the
negative impact it would have on the target.188 The pictures
and comments were added by other high school students and
distributed without regard for the fact that the speech would
find its way into the school environment. The record shows
that the victim of this speech felt its impact—refusing to
attend her classes, causing a disruption in her schooling.189
Therefore, the court in Kowalski would have been justified in
punishing such speech even under the new reasoning.
In Layshock and J.S., the websites were more passive
than in Kowalski. As mentioned before, however, Layshock’s
speech more substantially disrupted school and was therefore
punishable. In J.S.’s case, the student was not very reckless
about the speech—she protected it as much as she could and
the principal was only able to view it after a student printed a
copy and brought it into school.190 Classes were not disturbed
and though the students spoke about it in class, the speech
did not have much of an impact.191 Therefore, this speech
would not be punishable under the new standard. While the
courts may be clear on which standards to apply in certain
situations, and how exactly to apply Tinker to certain cases,
the problem does not end there.
Regardless of the manner in which the Court chooses to
redefine Tinker, the greatest need is for an unambiguous
guideline schools . . . can apply to Internet speech. Courts
must strike a delicate balance between maintaining a
productive and safe educational environment and allowing
free speech and Internet dialogue to flourish.192

D. Data Proposal
The problem with ubiquitous computing is that not only
is data simultaneously available to a great number of people,
but this data is also logged away and archived for future
access. Unlike a malicious note passed in class or a satirical
newsletter, this data is preserved for years and easily
188. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572–73.
189. See id. at 568.
190. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 921
(3d Cir. 2011).
191. See id.
192. King, supra note 19, at 876 (footnote omitted).
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accessible. “A great deal of information about a user’s online
actions can be collected quite easily. Activities, which in the
physical world traditionally have not led to the collection of
potentially private information, can and do lead to such
collection online.”193
In the Tinker-Fraser-Kuhlmeier-Morse quartet, all the
student speech was tangible in a way that cyberbullying is
not. There, speech consisted of black armbands, a school
newspaper, a student speech at an assembly, and a banner.194
In J.S., Layshock, and Kowalski, the cyberbullying was
conducted on websites and passed around to others through
the Internet. Once published or produced, it was easy to
replicate and difficult to completely eradicate. This means
that school districts, in looking to regulate cyberbullying, will
have a great deal more data on their students than previously
available and this may have an effect on what speech school
districts are allowed to proscribe and punish.
This data, which could have previously been a
conversation among a group of frustrated students, a
temporary venting of dissatisfaction or a quarrel, is now in
the hands of the school district in a permanent format. This
problem, created by the rise of ubiquitous computing, is not
accounted for in any of the Supreme Court’s decisions.195 The
concurrence in J.S. hints at the data issue but does not
address it.196 This increased access to data necessitates a
stringent standard for regulating Internet speech. The
jurisdiction analyses proposed earlier would ensure that even
if the school had access to data, the school district’s
jurisdiction over such data would be limited and governed by
the rule of law.197 This will ensure that the schools do not
repress students’ constitutional rights but will let schools
maintain a safe and bully-free environment for their
students.

193. Boone, supra note 20, at 118.
194. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 678 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 504 (1969).
195. See King, supra note 19, at 866.
196. J.S., 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
197. See supra Part III.B.1.
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CONCLUSION
The intersection of student speech, cyberbullying, and
ubiquitous computing is creating novel situations for courts
around the country. Student speech cannot be chilled by
excessive regulations and punishments. School officials must
guard student welfare.198 The circuit split examined in this
Comment is a harbinger of additional rifts in cyberbulling
jurisprudence. In order to fairly assess cyberbullying, courts
must determine whether a school has jurisdiction over the
speech.199 Then courts must examine whether the speech
caused a disruption in the school environment.200 Courts
must also be mindful of the excessive data available to the
government due to ubiquitous computing201 and be careful to
guard against constitutional violations.202

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Servance, supra note 165, at 1215, 1217.
See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.D.

